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Abstract 
An unsteady 1D hydraulic model (HEC—RAS) was implemented for the 
Chicago Area Waterways System (CAWS) for two configurations: i) current 
conditions, and i) physical separation with barriers. Hydrologic conditions were 
those for the 100-year storm event observed in September 2008. Combined Sewer 
Overflow hydrographs at +150 locations were estimated using the CityModel 
(InfoWorks). Historic conditions were defined by setting historic operation of 
gates and locks at controlling structures at Lakefront and Lockport. Also 
operation rules were set for required get open heights based on water levels at 
reference stations.  Results show that the physical barriers and a new operation 
(lakefront structures permanently full-open) do have important consequences on 
the water levels in the CAWS. Control of water levels from Lockport would be 
lost on the lakeside of the barrier, and Lake Michigan would become a dominant 
factor on water levels. Although peak water levels would not necessarily increase 
in the presence of the barrier, water levels remain higher thereby increasing the 
chances that submerged outfalls would not be able to discharge stormwater, 
runoff, and CSOs into CAWS, and that flow back-ups would occur in sewers. 
Since the storage capacity of the CAWS on the lakeside of the barrier would be 
significatively reduced, reversals volumes to Lake Michigan would increase in 
the presence of the barrier. 
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Chapter 1: Purpose and Scope 
 
In the Chicago Area Waterways (CAWS) drainage area, there are 255 CSO 
outfalls owned by the City of Chicago, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation 
District of Greater Chicago (MWRDGC), and surrounding municipalities. 
Chicago-area CSOs discharging to the CAWS currently drain away from Lake 
Michigan during most wet weather conditions. Consequently, the majority of 
CSO events in the Chicago metropolitan area do not affect Lake Michigan. 
However, the gates at the waterway controlling works that separate the Chicago-
area waters and Lake Michigan are opened during certain heavy rainfall events 
in order to prevent local flooding. 
At the same time, there is also a growing interest in controlling the 
potential migration of invasive species towards the Great Lakes. Hydrologic 
separation of the Great Lakes from the Mississippi River watershed is being 
considered as an alternative to prevent the migration of invasive species. Such 
separation by means of barriers in the waterways implies that the urban drainage 
system will have to operate under a very different set of conditions so having a 
model for the whole system could prove very useful.  The University of Illinois 
has worked towards the development of an urban hydrologic model for Chicago.  
Physical separation of the Great Lakes and Mississippi River Basin to 
prevent the movement of aquatic invasive species (AIS), particularly Asian Carp, 
consists in the conveyance of water towards Lake Michigan by means of physical 
(solid) barriers at specific points along the CAWS. Regardless of the number of 
barriers and their location, this alternative constitutes a major intervention to the 
system, which will have an important impact on drainage, flooding, water 
quality and transportation in the Chicago area.  
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This thesis focuses on evaluating the impact of physical barriers on the 
hydraulic performance of the CAWS during extreme rainfall events. The 
assessment will be based on a 1D numerical model of the entire CAWS using the 
package HEC-RAS. 
The main objective of this work is the estimation of the hydraulic capacity 
of the CAWS to convey the storm water runoff and combined sewer overflows 
(CSO) resulting from extreme rainfall events having different intensity, durations 
and frequencies. The main interest is on the impact of extreme rainfall events on 
the hydraulic performance of the CAWS, in the presence of different physical 
barriers along the South Branch of the Chicago River and the Calumet River. In 
particular, the September 13-15, 2008 storm event which resulted in +5 inches of 
rain in 24 hours (100-yr return period). This storm also indicates that the impact 
of antecedent conditions and back to back storms should be accounted for in the 
analysis of separation scenarios. 
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Chapter 2: Chicago Area Waterways System  
 
The City of Chicago, Illinois (IL) and many of its suburbs lie within the 
glacial Lake Chicago Plain. The Lake Chicago Plain encompasses the Chicago, 
Des Plaines, and Calumet Rivers. Early explorers discovered and used the 
Chicago Portage, an area within Mud Lake that was only 4.6 meters (m) above 
the level of Lake Michigan and near the watershed divide between the 
Mississippi River and the Great Lakes basins. Because of the low relief, the area 
was poorly drained. The level of Lake Michigan in the late 1800s was only 0.61 m 
below the riverbanks, making subsurface drainage ineffective. Flow from the 
North Branch Chicago River (NB) and the South Branch Chicago River (SB) 
joined just north of present-day Lake Street and flowed eastward into Lake 
Michigan. Sewage discharged into the Chicago River (CR) caused serious health 
hazards during the late 1800s as the river flowed into the lake and the sewage 
affected the drinking water supply from Lake Michigan. In 1900, a canal dug by 
the Sanitary District of Chicago (District) linking the CR to the Des Plaines River 
(Mississippi River basin) was completed and reversed the flow in the CR. This 
canal, the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal (CSSC) is 45 kilometers (km) from the 
SB to Lockport, IL. The CSSC carries urban drainage and wastewater away from 
the city and Lake Michigan. Other improvements in drainage were also 
implemented. In 1910, the North Shore Channel (NSC), constructed by the 
District connected Lake Michigan at Wilmette to the NB allowing the capture of 
sewage from North Shore suburbs and providing lake water to be used to flush 
sewage in the NB. In 1922, the Calumet Sag Channel (CSC), also constructed by 
the District, connected the Little Calumet River (LCR) to the CSSC. This provided 
for the partial reversal of the LCR and allowed sewage draining into this river 
and the Calumet River to be diverted away from Lake Michigan. The CSC has 
since been widened and improved for commercial navigation and complete 
 4 
reversal of the LCR. Collectively, all these improved and controlled waterways 
are referred to as the Chicago Waterway System (CAWS). 
Today (2013), the CR flows west from Lake Michigan, through downtown 
Chicago, and joins flow coming from the NB where it enters the SB/CSSC. 
Outflow from the entire CWS is controlled by the Lockport Powerhouse and 
Controlling Works (near Joliet, IL). Three lakefront structures control inflow 
from Lake Michigan and the infrequent release of excess floodwaters to the lake 
during extreme hydrologic events (i.e. intense rainfall). The CR is controlled by 
the Chicago River Controlling Works (CRCW) and the Chicago River Lock. The 
NSC is controlled by the Wilmette Pumping Station and Sluice Gate. The LCR is 
controlled by the O’Brien Lock and Dam on the Calumet River south of 130th 
Street in Chicago (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
During the summer months, water from Lake Michigan flows into the CR 
through sluice gates in the CRCW and through the Chicago River Lock at 
CRCW. Flow of water from Lake Michigan through the CRCW sluice gates into 
the CR during the summer months, called discretionary diversion; is used to 
preserve or improve the water quality in the CR, SB and CSSC. During winter, 
flow from Lake Michigan into the CR is small and typically results from leakage 
through the gates and sea walls at CRCW and from occasional navigational 
lockage. Other contributions to the CR discharge include water from direct 
precipitation and discharges of water used for cooling purposes from 
neighboring buildings. The NB carries runoff from a 100 square mile watershed 
and treated municipal sewage effluent released by the TJ O'Brien Water 
Reclamation Plant (before called North Side WRP) located 16 km upstream from 
the confluence of the branches. All of this effluent is transported down the SB 
into the CSSC and then to the Des Plaines and Illinois Rivers. 
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2.1 Controlling Works 
2.1.1 Lockport Powerhouse and Controlling Works 
The Lockport Controlling Works (LPCW) on the Chicago Sanitary and 
Ship Canal (CSSC) are located at Romeoville, IL. When the turbines and sluice 
gates at Lockport Powerhouse are insufficient, these structures are operated for 
diverting the flow from CAWS to Des Plaines River. The LPCW includes seven 
30 ft by 16 ft high sluice gates with invert at -15 ft according to MWRDGC and 
AECOM (2010). 
The Lockport Powerhouse (LPPH) is the downstream end of the CSSC 
and the CAWS. Water is diverted from the CAWS through two turbines and nine 
sluice gates (14’ height by 9’ width; invert at -28.48 ft) onto Des Plaines River. The 
facility also includes two locks for navigational purposes. However the locks 
were not included because they are closed during wet weather for flood 
management.  The tailwater elevation at LPPH is controlled by the Brandon Dam 
on the Illinois River, and it was set at -41 ft. 
On the Des Plaines River side of the controlling works, it was assumed a 
high water level condition in Des Plaines River when the gates are open. This 
assumption was for including the effect of Des Plaines on the discharge capacity 
of the controlling works. 
2.1.2 O’Brien Lock and Dam 
The O’Brien Lock and Dam is the southernmost connection of the CAWS 
with Lake Michigan. AECOM does not provide detailed information of the 
geometry of these structures because it is located far from the Area of Interest on 
their study (AECOM, 2010). The lock chamber was reduced to a single sluice gate 
110 ft wide at an invert -26.50 ft. The top of both gate and dam is at +5.5 ft. In 
addition, the dam has 4 sluice gates at invert -13 ft with dimensions of 10’ wide 
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and 10’ of height. This simplification should not have a significant effect on the 
overall results. 
2.1.3 Chicago River Controlling Works 
The Chicago River Controlling Works (CRCW) is located at the lakefront 
end on the Main Steam of the Chicago River. This was the natural outlet of the 
Chicago River before it was reversed when the CSSC was open for draining into 
the Des Plaines River. It includes several structures represented in HEC-RAS by 
inline and lateral weirs and gates.  
The first set of structures is the U.S. North Pier and North Basin Wall, 
which includes the North Gates: Four sluice gates (10’x10’) with invert of -18 ft, 
and weir top above +6.8 ft. The lock chamber is bounded by the North and South 
walls defined as weirs with top +7ft, except on the middle of the North wall 
where the lock control house is located (top at +419.8 ft). The Turning Basin 
Cutoff Wall (south) is the fourth set of structure. It includes 4 sluice gates 
(10’x10’) with invert of -17.69 ft that are operated for flood control. The last set is 
the Lock gates, which were defined as Inline Structures in HEC-RAS. Two of 
them define the East- and Westbound of the Lock chamber. Both of them include 
10 gates with invert of -24.44 ft, 40 ft of height, and 8 ft of width. 
2.1.4 Wilmette Pumping Station 
Wilmette controlling works currently operates only for flood control and 
navigation diversions, though it was originally designed as a navigational lock. It 
is located at Wilmette, IL on the northern boundary of the CAWS on the 
Lakefront. In the model the structure is represented by a 120 ft long weir at an 
elevation of +6 ft. A 32.0’ wide by 15.5’ high sluice gate is located on the south 
side. A lateral structure was defined for accounting overflows onto Sheridan 
Avenue when water reaches an elevation of +6 CCD. 
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The single gate at Wilmette was replaced recently by three smaller gates. 
Unfortunately an updated geometry was not available to be included in the 
present model. 
2.2 Mid-System Barriers 
For the scenarios with barriers the computational domain was split 
upstream of confluence of Bubbly Creek to account for the south Branch Barrier 
(Figure 3). A no-flow boundary condition was set up at this location, while the 
water level was to be computed with the HEC-RAS model. Also it was assumed 
that the lakefront controlling works remain fully open all time. Under this 
operative scheme the top priority is flood control for the City of Chicago 
regardless of quality issues, reversal flows, or limitations on diversion 
accounting. 
The South barrier is to be placed between O’Brien Lock & Dam (Figure 3). 
A no-flow condition was set up to represent the separation effect by the barrier. 
The operation of Lockport powerhouse (LPPH) turbines and flood control gates, 
and Lockport Controlling Works (LPCW) follows the MWRDGC Dispatcher 
Manual (2013) for both conditions with and without barriers. 
2.3 Chicago Waterways Storage Capacity 
An important impact of the barriers on the CAWS hydraulics is the 
reduction of the storage capacity in the waterways. In the case of the lakeside of 
the South Branch Barrier this is aggravated if the lakefront gates remain open, 
even during dry weather. A volume rating curve is presented in Figure 4. 
Corresponding volumes for water levels ranging from -35 CCD to 10 CCD were 
computed from the USGS & UIUC Bathymetric Survey data (2008) using the 
Surface Volume (3D Analyst ®) tool in ArcGIS 10.1® assuming a constant level in 
the entire domain. In this manner it was possible to develop volume rating 
curves for each reach of the CAWS as shown in Figure 5. 
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If we consider that the flood control levels on the lakeside of the barrier to 
play with when a storm hits the city are -2 CCD and 4 CCD, the flood control 
volume in CAWS is reduced from 4 BG (=13.6 – 9.6) to 0.8 BG (=2.8 – 2.0), i.e. a 
contraction of 80%. 
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Figure 2 Schematic of Chicago Area Waterways System (HEC-RAS Model domain) 
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Figure 3 Location of barriers for Mid-system alternatives 
 (Only Barriers 1 and 2 are considered in this study) 
  
Credit: HDR 
1 
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Figure 4 Total storage volume rating curves 
 
Figure 5 Storage volume rating curves for CAWS reaches 
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Chapter 3: Methods and Tools 
3.1 HEC-RAS model 
The Hydrologic Engineering Center’s River Analysis system (HEC-RAS) is 
a widely used one-dimensional hydraulic model. In this study only the unsteady 
flow model was implemented. It allows simulating the hydraulic behavior of 
CAWS under time changing conditions and operation of structures. 
The theoretical background of the unsteady module of HEC-RAS is 
supported on the principle of conservation of mass (continuity equation) and the 
principle of conservation of momentum. A brief discussion on the derivation of 
those equations is presented in the Hydraulic Reference Manual of HEC-RAS, 
based on a more complete article by James A. Liggett in Mahmood and Yevjevich 
(1970).  
Basic data required by the unsteady HEC-RAS model includes Geometry 
Schematic (stream alignments, cross-sections, junction nodes, etc.), flow data 
(boundary and initial conditions: flow or stage hydrographs, lateral inflows, 
rating curves, operation of structures, etc.), and computational parameters (time 
step, simulation period, computational tolerances, etc.). Following are the main 
characteristics of the HEC-RAS model that was implemented for CAWS. 
3.1.1 Geometric schematization 
Stream alignments and cross-sections were based on a bathymetry 
surveyed by USGS and UIUC in 2008. Features of a previously implemented 
model for CAWS were also included (AECOM, 2010) and modify for the 
particularities of this study. A fixed Manning’s roughness of 0.03 was set for the 
entire domain. Further calibration of this parameter was not performed because 
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it was observed a low sensibility of water levels to this parameter. This is not 
surprising given the low velocities of the flow in the system. 
HEC-RAS allows defining inline and lateral structures in the geometry 
schematization. Only sluice gates and Overflow (Open Air) gates were used in 
CAWS model. Inline sluice gates (flow through structures continues in same 
stream) were defined at Wilmette, O’Brien Lock & Dam, and Lockport 
Powerhouse. North and South gates at CRCW, Lockport Controlling Works and 
turbines were defined as sluice gates in lateral structures (diverting flow into 
another reach). This type of gates follows the following relation: 
     √    
Where : Q = flow discharge      [L³T-1] 
 C = coefficient of discharge   [-] 
 W = length of gate (along cross section)   [L] 
B  = gate opening      [L] 
g  = acceleration of gravity    [LT-2] 
H = Upstream energy head   [L] 
         (Difference Tail and Head water levels) 
However, if downstream submergence occurs HEC-RAS solves the equation: 
     √     
 O’Brien Lock and CRCW sector gates were modeled as open air overflow 
gates following the equation  
         
Geometric characteristics of each structure are described in Section 2.1. 
Sluice gates coefficients (C) for CRCW North and South Gates were 
chosen to follow rating curves for fully open conditions developed by UIUC 
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using a 3D numerical model (Kim & Garcia, 2013). In order to find the most 
appropriate values of C the Chicago River Main Steam alone was modeled under 
steady flow conditions using HEC-RAS unsteady flow module. Best C-values 
correspond to closest head losses estimated with the model given Lake level -3 
CCD and fully open gates (as assumed by Kim et al, 2013). For a given flow 
discharge entering Main Steam at Wolf Point and leaving through fully open 
gates, there is a corresponding water level at CAWS. Since lake level was a 
boundary condition the head losses at the structures can be computed directly. 
From Figure 6 and Figure 7 best matches were for C = 0.7 at South Gates (Figure 
6) and C = 0.6 at North Gates (Figure 7), and C is the coefficient for submerged 
orifice.  
A similar exercise was done for sector gates (Lock), but none of the values 
for C provided satisfactory results (Figure 8). Therefore the default value in HEC-
RAs (C=2.6) was left. For Lockport pit gates and turbines values suggested by 
Kiefer (n.d.) were defined as C=0.613 and C=0.35, respectively. At Wilmette C = 
0.5 for sluice gate, and at O'Brien Lock & Dam C = 0.5 for sluice gates and C = 3 
for lock gate. The latter values as defined by AECOM (2010). 
3.1.2 Flow data 
Boundaries at lake front and downstream of Lockport were defined by 
stage hydrographs using historic data (historic 2008 scenario) or a fixed level as 
defined for different scenarios. Flow hydrographs from USGS stations at North 
Branch Chicago River at Albany, and Little Calumet River were used as 
upstream boundary conditions for those reaches. CSOs estimated with the 
CityModel were included in the model as lateral local inflows. 
Operation of lateral and Inline structures at Wilmette PS, CWCR, O'Brien 
Lock & Dam and Lockport Powerhouse and controlling Works were defined 
with a set of operation rules based on reference levels in CAWS. More details on 
the criteria is presented in Section 2.1 
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3.2 Modeling Scenarios 
A total of 9 scenarios are presented herein. Each one defined by a different 
set of the following variables (Table 1): 
 Precipitation event: historic event of September 13th – 15th 2008 was 
considered as the extreme rain event for CSO estimations. 
 Presence of barriers: Current conditions (no barriers) vs. proposed 
mid-system (two barriers) 
 TARP capacity: independent of total storage volume of TARP, it may 
happen that a previous storm reduces the available storage of TARP 
for runoff retention due to an extreme event (as in September 2008).  
This condition is represented by a Finite-TARP in the CityModel 
(Garcia & Schimdt, 2013). On the other hand, if TARP capacity is so 
large that is not a concern in terms of storage capacity; an Infinite-
TARP condition is set in the CityModel for the estimation of CSOs into 
CAWS. 
 Water levels in Lake Michigan: Two elevations were proposed by GLC 
for evaluating the effect of Lake Michigan on CAWS during extreme 
storm events: 0 CCD and +3 CCD. These values represent normal and 
high water levels in Lake Michigan. 
3.2.1 Storm event 
A storm event can be characterized by its intensity (volume of rain falling 
per unit time per unit area, usually inches per hour) and duration. Different 
combinations of these two variables are related to certain probability of 
occurrence of similar or larger events during a single year. The return period is 
simply the inverse of such probability, and it is commonly used for referring a 
storm on a hydrologic analysis. Therefore, the 100-year storm event (return 
period is 100 years) has a probability of occurrence during a single year of 1/100 
= 0.01 (or 1%).  
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Instead of using a synthetic storm, a historic event with a return period of 
100-years was used. The storm event of September 13-15th 2008 was chosen as it 
has become a common reference for flood analysis in the City of Chicago (Figure 
9). The total precipitation within this period was about 6.5 inches, distributed in 
two consecutive storms: the first one with maximum intensity of 0.7 in/hr on 
average, and the second one with a maximum intensity of 0.3 in/hr.  Because of 
its bimodal distribution on time (double peak) it allows to consider a critical 
situation when a storm hits the city right after another one. This is a strenuous 
situation for a flood control system, since the first event may reduce substantially 
the system capacity to respond during the second storm. In the context of the 
City of Chicago this means that even with a large enough capacity of TARP for 
containing a storm event, it may occur (and has occurred in the past) that there is 
not enough available storage for a second storm. 
3.2.2 Historic Operation of flood control structures 
In addition to the hydrological data on the CAWS, the model requires 
information on the operation of the hydraulic structures in order to compute 
reversal flows at the lakefront and outflows at the outlet (LPPH). MWRDGC 
provided the operational logs (historical records) of gates and pumping activity 
(open height and effluents) for the month of September 2008. 
Operation logs were used to define time series of gate openings at gates and 
turbine flows. Open height for CRCW (North and South gates), Wilmette, 
O'Brien Lock & Dam, and Lockport Powerhouse and Controlling works are 
presented in Figure 12 to Figure 15. 
3.2.3 Mid-System Barriers 
For the scenarios with barriers the computational domain was split 
upstream of confluence of Bubbly Creek (Figure 11). A no-flow boundary 
condition was set up at this location, while the water level was to be computed 
with the HEC-RAS model. Also lakefront controlling works remain fully open all 
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time. Under this operative scheme the top priority is flood control for the City of 
Chicago regardless of quality issues, reversal flows, or limitations on diversion 
accounting. 
The South barrier is to be placed between O’Brien Lock & Dam (Figure 
11). A no-flow condition was set up to represent the separation effect by the 
barrier. The operation of Lockport powerhouse (LPPH) turbines and flood 
control gates, and Lockport Controlling Works (LPCW) follows the MWRDGC 
Dispatcher Manual for both conditions with and without barriers except for the 
historic scenario (S05) where gate openings and flows through turbines were 
defined as in MWRDGC operation logs. 
3.2.4 Water levels in Lake Michigan 
Two conditions in Lake Michigan were considered in this analysis as 
boundary condition. Initially a level of +0 CCD (579.196 ft) was defined on the 
Lake by Wilmette, CRCW, and O’Brien Lock & Dam. This represent is a ‘normal’ 
condition of the Lake. The second value of +3 CCD (582.196 ft) was to represent a 
high Lake condition. Historic data compiled at NOAA on the Great Lake Hydro-
Climate Dashboard (GLHCD) (Gronewold, Clites, Hunter, & Smith, 2013) was 
used for verification (Figure 10).  
3.3 Location of virtual gages in CAWS 
Key locations were defined in order to check peak and duration of high 
levels in the system for each one of the modeled scenarios. A total of 10 locations 
were considered for comparison of water levels and discharges for each modeled 
scenario (Figure 11 and Table 2) 
Critical levels were defined at most of these locations as the maximum 
admissible level at lakefront structures (Wilmette, CRCW, and O’Brien L&D) 
based on MWRDGC (2013). For the rest of locations critical levels were defined 
based on maximum historic levels for September 13-15th 2008, as they are 
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strongly related to the operation of Lockport and lakefront gates. Critical levels 
for key locations along CAWS are shown in Table 2. 
3.4 Combined Sewer Overflows (CSO) 
Combined Sewer Overflows in the hydraulic model were as estimated 
with the City Model on InfoWorks (Garcia & Schimdt, 2013). Two conditions of 
TARP were considered. The first one, Finite-TARP from herein, assumes a limited 
storage capacity of TARP. This condition represents a back-to-back storm event, 
in which a previous storm already filled up TARP tunnels and reservoirs, so that 
a considerable fraction of the precipitation drains into CAWS as CSO. This is 
considered a critical, but feasible scenario and it is independent of the actual 
capacity of TARP. Although it is true that an increased storage capacity of TARP 
would reduce the frequency of occurrence of such scenario, it is consider feasible 
and expected, as it have happened before in September 2008, and more recently 
in April 2013. 
The second condition of TARP considered in this analysis, is that its 
capacity is much larger than the volume of water coming from a storm event 
(referred as Infinite-TARP from this point). In this case it is assume that the 
interceptors, tunnels, and reservoirs have enough capacity to convey and/or 
store a humungous volume of water. In consequence, CSOs into CAWS are 
dramatically reduced. Some CSOs still may occur due to conveyance limitations 
in the system (bottle necks) rather than because of storage limitations. Each of 
these outfalls is included on the hydraulic model as a local lateral inflow. 
For the 100-years storm an estimated total volume of 9.84 BG and a 
maximum CSO discharge of 23,000 cfs (cumulative) with Finite-TARP condition 
were estimated for CAWS. While for Infinite-TARP 0.09 Billion Gallons (BG) and 
a peak discharge of 695 cfs were estimated (Figure 16 and Figure 17). 
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3.5 Lockport operation rules 
The operation of controlling works on the lakefront boundaries of CAWS 
(Wilmette, CRCW, and O’Brien Lock & Dam) and Lockport were based on the 
Dispatcher Manual 2013 by MWRDGC for flood control during wet weather. 
However, the operation paradigm was shift so that once open, gates are not 
closed again (Table 3).  
For the scenarios With Barrier the lakefront gates were fully open during 
the entire simulation period. On the scenarios Without Barriers, the criteria for 
gate opening are as stated in MWRDG Dispatcher Manual (2013); however once 
they are open they are not closed again. 
Lockport Powerhouse and Controlling Works are operated following the 
recommendations in MRDGC Manual. However, for some scenarios the 
operation of turbines was defined as a fixed discharge leaving the system (2,500 
cfs) for sake of model stability. The scenarios AE002, and AE004 (Table 1) were as 
defined in AECOM model (2010) for sake of stability. 
On the Lockport boundary the operation was defined as follows: 
1) Maximum/ Minimum (targets) admissible water levels at 
i) CRCW:    -0.5 CCD/-3.0 CCD 
ii) O’Brien Lock & Dam:  -0.5 CCD / -3.0 CCD 
iii) Cal-Sag Junction:  -1.8 CCD / -4.0 CCD 
iv) Lockport CW:   -2.0 CCD / -10 CCD 
2) Maximize flow through turbines (maximum opening: 14 ft) 
3) If turbines’ gates are fully open and water levels are still above admissible, 
open Pit-Sluice gates (up to 9) in the following sequence (maximum opening: 
14 ft): 
i) 7A & 7C  
ii) 4A & 4C 
iii) 3A & 3C 
iv) 7B 
v) 4B 
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vi) 3B 
4) If Pit-Sluice gates are fully open and water levels are still above admissible, 
open Lockport Controlling Works gates (up to 7) in the following sequence: 
i) CW1 & CW2 
ii) CW3 & CW4 
iii) CW5 & CW6 & CW7 
5) If water levels drawdown below maximum admissible levels, close the gates 
in the inverse order 
AECOM (2010) also defined a dry weather operation of gates based on target 
water levels at key locations, so that the water levels remain in a tighter interval 
around these values unless maximum or minimum water levels are reached. This 
option should be explored in future work with the HEC-RAS model by UIUC. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1 Summary of hydraulic modeling scenarios 
Scenario Barrier 
Lake Michigan 
level (CCD) TARP 
Storm 
(Return Period) 
Structures 
Operation 
S05 No Historic Finite 100-years Historic 
S19 Yes 0 Finite 100-years Rules 
S115 No 0 Finite 100-years Rules 
S17 Yes 0 Infinite 100-years Rules 
S117 No 0 Infinite 100-years Rules 
S20 / S16 Yes +3 Finite 100-years Rules 
AE002 No +3 Finite 100-years Rules 
S18 Yes +3 Infinite 100-years Rules 
AE004 No +3 Infinite 100-years Rules 
 
Table 2 Virtual gages for computed water levels and flow discharges 
Site Reach River Mile 
(aprox.) 
Critical level 
(CCD) 
Wilmette North Shore Channel 340.79 5.0 
TJ O'Brien WRP North Shore Channel 336.50 - 
Lawrence Ave Chicago River North 326.86 4.0 
Grand Ave Chicago River North 326.05 3.5 
Columbus Chicago Main River 326.62 3.5 
Roosevelt Rd Chicago River South Branch 324.35 2.0 
31 St & western Ave Chicago Sanit.and Ship Canal 321.50 -1.5 
Stickney Chicago Sanit.and Ship Canal 315.23 - 
O'Brien L&D Calumet River 325.75 3.5 
Lemont Chicago Sanit.and Ship Canal 302.49 - 
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Table 3 Operation of controlling works at lakefront for scenarios without barriers 
Location Structure 
Begins to open 
(ft-CCD) 
Opening rate 
(ft/min) 
Max. Open 
(ft) 
Wilmette Sluice Gates 5.0 1 18 
CRCW 
North Gates 3.2 1 10 
South Gates 3.0 1 10 
Sector gates 
(Lock) 
3.4 4 40 
O’Brien 
L&D 
Lock gates 3.3 5.5 27 
Sluice gates 3.0 1 10 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Submerged discharge coefficient for CRCW South Gates 
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 Figure 7 Submerged discharge coefficient for CRCW North Gates 
 
 
Figure 8 Discharge coefficient for CRCW Sector gates (Lock) 
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Figure 9 Intensity and cumulative precipitation 100-years storm 
 
 
Figure 10 Lake wide monthly averaged - Lake Michigan from 1950 – 2013 
Maximum =3.2 CCD ( 582.35 ft) 
+3 CCD ( 582.2 ft) 
0 CCD ( 582.2 ft) 
Average 1918 - 2013 
 
Source: NOAA (2013)  
Minimum = -3.18 CCD (576.02 ft) 
 26 
 
 
 
  
F
ig
u
re
 1
1
 L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 v
ir
tu
a
l 
g
a
g
e
 s
ta
ti
o
n
s 
 27 
 
 
Figure 12 Historical sluice gates operation at Lockport Powerhouse 
 
 
Figure 13 Gate Open Height at Wilmette Pumping Station (09/09-18/2013) 
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Figure 14 Historic operations of Lock and North and South Sluice Gates at CRCW on 
September 2008 
Note: Sluice Gate 3 on CRCW was inoperative and remained close during the entire period. 
 
 
Figure 15 Historic Operations of Lock and Sluice Gates at O’Brien Lock and Dam on 
September 2008 
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Figure 16 CSO hydrograph for 100-years storm with Finite- and Infinite- TARP capacity 
 
Figure 17 Volumes of water drained into CAWS during 100-years storm event for finite-and 
infinite-TARP capacities 
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Chapter 4: Results 
In general, the effect of the barriers and the new operational paradigm 
(lakefront gates permanently fully open) do have important consequences on the 
water levels in CAWS. With the South Branch Barrier the possibility of 
controlling water levels from Lockport would be lost on the lakeside of CAWS. 
Instead, Lake Michigan becomes a dominant factor on the water levels, 
particularly close to the controlling works (Wilmette Pumping station, Main 
Steam). If an extreme storm hits the City when Lake Michigan level is high 
(around +3 CCD) there is a major risk that submerged outfalls will not be able to 
discharge CSO into CAWS and that flow back-ups occur in the sewer pipes. Also 
reversal volumes would be increased in the presence of the barriers because any 
CSOs from outfalls and pumping stations, effluents from O’Brien WRP, and 
inflows from NBCR would be evacuated through the lakefront gates. 
On the Lockport side of the barriers flow discharges are reduced in 
presence of the barriers. In that case the upper reach of the CSSC would basically 
convey only CSOs from Racine Avenue Pumping Stations (RAPS), down to 
Stickney WRP. On the Cal-Sag and Calumet River branch, Little Calumet River is 
the most important inflow into CAWS. Because of the reduction of the discharge 
in CSSC, peak levels are lower at the Cal-Sag Junction and the Cal-Sag canal has 
enough conveyance capacity for draining the water towards Lockport with no 
significant variations on peak water levels by O’Brien Lock & Dam. 
4.1 Case 1: Historic conditions 
A trial-and-error approach allowed to revise and adjust computational 
parameters in the model, and to double-check data from operational logs, 
estimate effluents into the CAWS and outflows through the controlling works 
and locks. 
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Figure 18 shows that at Lockport Powerhouse the model is in good 
agreement with observed data for the period 0 – 40 hours. Then inflow discharge 
decreases slowly, but outflows computed with the model are high enough to 
decline at a higher rate than as observed in the field. Therefore after the peak 
level at 54 Hrs (-6.17 ft CCD), the error increases, with a greater rate after 85 Hrs. 
The max estimated outflow through the LPPH sluice gates for this period ranges 
is about 9,600 cfs, plus 3,000 cfs through turbines, and 2400 cfs diverted by 
LPCW. Max total is close to 15,000 cfs, which is greater than the total inflow of 
about 9,500 cfs from WRPs, RAPS, NBPS, and some CSOs, and tributaries. 
At Grand Ave (Figure 19) computed levels are slightly lower than 
observed for dry weather, although discharges are similar (t < 48 HRS and t > 
96). When the storm hits, both modeled discharges and water levels are above 
observed values, though follows a similar trend (shape). The maximum 
computed discharge at Grand Ave was about 12,500 cfs.  
At Wilmette, on the North end of the CAWS, water levels are 
overestimated for the first peak of the storm, then -as mentioned before- water 
levels in model turn to be systematically lower than observed (Figure 20). 
The differences between observed and computed levels might be due to 
inconsistencies on the controlling works operational logs, underestimates of the 
inflows from sources, or overestimates of controlling works and turbines 
discharge capacities. It was noticed that water levels at Des Plains Rivers have a 
considerable impact on the diverted outflow at the LPCW, and finally water 
levels near the LPPH. This is another source of uncertainty that may explain the 
differences between estimated and observed levels in the CAWS. 
Another hypothesis is that discrepancies between observations and model 
are because assuming any CSO at connecting structures is effectively discharged 
into CAWS independent of waterways levels. In reality, water levels in CAWS 
due have important inference as submerged outfalls may be blocked with a tide 
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gate or even get back flows from the River if the head difference is in favor of 
CAWS. It is possible then that the real CSO hydrographs are smoother, lower 
and longer than those obtained with CityModel, as the sewer pipe network 
would become a storage element under the right conditions. 
A model for CSO estimation that accounts for the river stage and outfall-
CAWS interaction would be helpful on improving this issue. 
4.2 Case 2: Lake Michigan at 0 CCD and Finite-TARP 
capacity 
With Lake Michigan at 0 CCD and a limited storage capacity of TARP, 
water levels are higher without the barriers as the available volume on the canals 
are used for storing CSOs and minimize flow reversals to Lake Michigan. That is 
the reason that water levels at Wilmette and Columbus are slightly above their 
corresponding critical levels without barrier; once the gates at lakefront are open 
the levels in CAWS are drawdown close to 0 CCD. With the barriers, on the other 
hand, CAWS levels are imposed by Lake Michigan and therefore remain higher 
than without the barrier for “dry” conditions. 
Peak flow discharge is reached earlier on the case with no barrier because 
the water flows directly to Lake Michigan; also it takes longer for evacuating the 
flow from the CAWS to the Lake since there is a smaller head difference. On the 
other hand, the case with no barrier has a delayed maximum peak flow because 
there is an available storage volume in the CAWS that has to be filled before 
opening the lakefront gates. The case without barrier is similar to a “flush” 
operation, and normal conditions are recovered much faster. 
Maximum water levels are reached in Lawrence Ave, about one-mile 
south from the confluence for both cases with and without the barrier. In fact the 
responses to the storm on water levels and flow discharge are very similar on 
both scenarios. Figure 21 shows that after the first storm-peak (+48 hours) both 
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hydrographs come very close until the storm passed (about 80 hours). These 
similarities are because at this location the conditions at NBCR are dominant 
over Lake Michigan levels. As the flow is conveyed south towards Wolf Point or 
north towards Wilmette, the differences on water levels with and without 
barriers become more important (compare for instance Figure 21 and Figure 22). 
On the south side of CAWS, at O’Brien Lock & Dam model results have 
similar water levels and flow discharges with and without barriers (Figure 23). 
Even for the No Barrier scenario water does not reach the critical levels for 
opening the sluice gates (+3.5 CCD). Therefore the existing structure acts as a 
barrier in this case. 
4.3 Case 3: Lake 0 CCD and Infinite-TARP capacity 
In Figure 16 it was showed that CSOs are drastically reduced with 
Infinite-TARP condition. Although CSOs from storm events have some effect on 
water levels in CAWS, it is not enough to raise them up to critical values near the 
lakefront. In general, maximum water levels are higher without the barrier as 
CAWS storage capacity is used, but in none of the scenarios the critical level was 
exceeded at the controlling works.   
Since critical levels were not reached near the lakefront, there was no 
reversal flow at all for the case without barriers: All the water from the storm 
was stored in TARP and the canals or evacuated through Lockport Powerhouse. 
On the other hand, with the barrier the lakefront remains open and there are 
flow reversals to the Lake on CRCW and Wilmette that sum up 5.9 BG (Figure 24 
and Figure 25). Similar situation is observed on the south side by O’Brian Lock & 
Dam (Figure 26). 
4.4 Case 4: Lake +3 CCD and Finite-TARP capacity 
A more critical flooding scenario is with high water levels in Lake 
Michigan. A value of +3 CCD is close to historic maximum and to critical levels 
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of CAWS before reversal flows occur under current operation. As mentioned 
before, the level of the Lake becomes a boundary condition for the CAWS when 
the gates at lakefront are open. With the barriers it implies that water level at 
CAWS remain above +3 CCD and even higher when the storm hits. On the 
Lockport side of the barrier, the barrier limits the CSO flow and the water levels 
at CSSC and Cal-Sag canal are lower than without the barrier, as well as flow 
discharges. 
At Wilmette and Columbus Dr. the differences on maximum water levels 
with and without barriers are small once the storm hits and the controlling works 
are open Figure 27 and Figure 28. Lawrence Ave., near the confluence with 
NBCR is a critical point because of inflows from this tributary, and because it is 
far enough from the lake front. Maximum water levels exceed +8 CCD when 
barrier is in place, and would be about a foot lower without barrier (Figure 29). 
The peaks are attenuated as they travel towards the Lake by Wilmette or CRCW. 
When there is no barrier but Lake Michigan is high, once the gates are 
open and the reversal flows are flushed to Lake Michigan, Lockport Powerhouse 
becomes the only system outlet; thereby some flow at CRCW towards Lockport 
after the storm is observed. 
Downstream of the north barrier, at 31st & Western (Figure 30) the flow 
discharges are limited to RAPS effluents during wet weather conditions. For 
example the maximum peak of +5,000 cfs corresponds to the maximum capacity 
of RAPS; but when there are no CSOs the flow discharge is null (t < 48 Hrs). 
Without the barrier, given a Lake Level of +3 CCD, levels are controlled by 
Lockport Powerhouse until the storm hits and critical levels are reached at 
Wilmette and CRCW; then lakefront gates are permanently open and water level 
is drawdown. But once the storm is over, since the gates remain open, the water 
flows from Lake Michigan into CAWS. The water level stabilizes above +2 CCD 
at 31st & Western, with a flow discharge close to 9,000 cfs. 
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At O’Brien Lock & Dam, the water level with the barrier is higher than 
with the barrier, but still does not reach critical values for gate opening. 
Discharges with the barrier in place are null (Figure 31). 
4.5 Case 5: Lake +3 CCD and Infinite-TARP capacity 
If large enough storage is available at TARP when the storm hits, water 
levels are not largely affected by the storm in any case. This is observed in 
relatively small variations of water levels during the simulation periods at 
different locations (Figure 32 to Figure 35). On the lakeside of the barrier water 
levels are increased by the barrier, because the gates remain open for a high Lake 
Michigan; notice that elevations at these locations remain above +3 CCD when 
barrier is in place. Without the barrier water levels are controlled from Lockport. 
With the barrier water level at Columbus Dr. is basically fixed by Lake 
Michigan (+3 CCD) for the entire simulation period (Figure 32). Without barriers, 
the water level at Columbus is controlled from LPPH, and stays close to -2 CCD. 
The slight increase of the level on the latter case is due mainly to inflows from 
NBCR. At Lawrence Ave. the effect of the storm seems to be more important on 
water levels and flow discharge (Figure 33). This is explained in great manner 
because is the closest location to the NBCR confluence.  
Downstream of the north barrier, on 31st & Western Ave, there are no big 
differences between maximum water levels when the barrier is in place (Figure 
34). However the flow hydrographs are very different: without the barrier all the 
water on the lake side of the barrier goes through this location towards Lockport 
with NBCR as major tributary; but with the barrier the only source is RAPS 
during wet conditions. At O’Brien Lock and Dam critical water levels for flow 
reversals are not reached in any case. With the barrier water levels goes slightly 
down, maybe because the water level at the junction goes down (Figure 35).  
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4.6 Fraction of time critical levels are exceeded 
A complimentary analysis to the time series is presented. The main 
purpose is to find what fraction of time that critical levels in CAWS are exceeded 
with and without the barriers. Mainly because higher water levels for longer 
periods imply higher probabilities back up flows in the sewer system caused by 
submerged outfalls. Cumulative Frequency Distributions (CFD) of the simulated 
water levels were used for this purpose. Then, the fractions of time of exceedence 
of critical levels for different scenarios at each location were summarized on the 
bar graphs presented below. 
Close to the lakefront the probability of exceeding critical levels is lower 
than for stations in inner locations. At Columbus critical levels are not exceeded 
as the gates are enough for controlling water levels; at Wilmette critical levels are 
not exceeded, except for +3 CCD and Finite-TARP at Wilmette (1%) (Figure 36). 
Closer to the South Branch Barrier at Roosevelt Rd without barrier water 
levels were higher than with the barrier only for Lake at 0 CCD and Finite-TARP 
(Figure 37). This is because in that case a larger flow discharge is conveyed 
towards Lockport than once the barrier is in place. However, for high levels at 
Lake Michigan (+3 CCD) CAWS behave as a pool; thereby water level remains 
above critical at that station during the entire simulation (not 100% because of 
numerical instabilities during initial time steps). The barrier aggravates this 
condition by increasing the probability from 0.63 to 0.99 when Lake is +3 CCD. 
However, with Infinite-TARP critical levels are not exceeded. 
At Lawrence Ave. water surface also spends a considerable fraction of 
time above critical elevation. The effect of the barrier is more evident for the case 
Finite-TARP, Lake level 3 CCD, and 100-year storm. For those conditions the 
fraction of time above critical levels is raised from 0.31 to 0.46 (Figure 38). 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 4 Fraction of time that critical water levels are exceeded on the lakeside of South Branch 
Barrier 
Storm 
Return 
Period 
Lake 
level 
TARP Barrier Wilmette 
Lawrence 
Ave 
Grand 
Ave 
Columbus 
Roosevelt 
Rd 
100 
0 
Finite Y 0 0.17 0 0 0 
N 0 0.18 0.04 0 0.10 
Infinite Y 0 0 0 0 0 
 N 0 0 0 0 0 
3 
Finite Y 0.01 0.46 0.11 0 0.99 
N 0 0.31 0.04 0 0.63 
Infinite Y 0 0 0 0 0.99 
N 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5 Fraction of time that critical water levels are exceeded on the Lockport side of South 
Branch Barrier 
Storm 
Return 
Period 
Lake level TARP Barrier 
31st & 
Western 
O’Brien Lock & 
Dam 
Sag-Junction 
100 
0 
Finite N 0.60 0 0.27 
Y 0.11 0 0.03 
Infinite N 0.66 0 0.07 
 Y 0.60 0 0.02 
3 
Finite N 0.98 0 0.63 
Y 0.64 0 0.03 
Infinite N 0.98 0 0.00 
Y 0.64 0 0.03 
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Figure 18 Model and observed water levels and flow discharge upstream of Lockport 
Powerhouse - Historic operation (09/11-17/2008) 
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Figure 19 Model and observed water levels and flow discharge at Grand Ave – 
 Historic operation (09/11-17/2008) 
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Figure 20 Model and observed water levels and flow discharge at Wilmette Pumping Station – 
 Historic operation (09/11-17/2008) 
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Figure 21 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Lawrence Ave – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 22 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Wilmette PS – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 23 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at O'Brien Lock & Dam – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 24 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Columbus Dr. – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 25 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Wilmette Pumping Station – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 26 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at O'Brien Lock & Dam – 
Lake Michigan 0 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 27 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Wilmette Pumping Station– 
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 28 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Columbus Dr. – 
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 29 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Lawrence – 
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 30 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at 31st & Western (Lockport side 
of South Branch Barrier)–Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 31 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at O'Brien Lock & Dam -  
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Finite-TARP 
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Figure 32 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Columbus Dr. -  
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 33 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at Lawrence Dr. -  
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 34 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at 31st & Western. -  
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
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Figure 35 Effect of barrier on water level and flow discharge at O'Brien Lock & Dam. -  
Lake Michigan +3 CCD and Infinite-TARP 
 
Figure 36 Fraction of time critical levels are exceeded at Wilmette 
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Figure 37 Fraction of time critical levels are exceeded at Roosevelt Rd. 
 
 
Figure 38 Fraction of time critical levels are exceeded at Lawrence Rd 
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Chapter 5: Main Findings 
In general, the effect of the barriers and the new operational paradigm 
(lakefront gates permanently fully open) do have important consequences on the 
water levels in CAWS. With the South Branch Barrier the possibility of 
controlling water levels from Lockport would be lost on the lakeside of CAWS. 
Instead, Lake Michigan becomes a dominant factor on the water levels, 
particularly close to the controlling works (Wilmette Pumping station, Main 
Steam). If an extreme storm hits the City when Lake Michigan level is high 
(around +3 CCD) there is a major risk that submerged outfalls will not be able to 
discharge CSO into CAWS and that flow back-ups will occur in the sewer pipes. 
Also reversal volumes would be increased in the presence of the barriers because 
any CSOs from outfalls and pumping stations, effluents from O’Brien WRP, and 
inflows from NBCR would be evacuated through the lakefront gates. 
In the Lockport side of the barriers flow discharges are reduced. In the 
presence of the barriers the north reach of the CSSC would basically convey only 
CSOs from Racine Avenue Pumping Stations (RAPS), down to Stickney WRP. 
On the Cal-Sag and Calumet River branch, Little Calumet River is the most 
important inflow into CAWS. Because of the reduction of the discharge in CSSC, 
peak levels are lower at the Cal-Sag Junction and the Cal-Sag canal has enough 
conveyance capacity for draining the water towards Lockport with no significant 
variations on peak water levels by O’Brien Lock & Dam. 
The following are the most relevant findings on this study for purpose of 
this study: 
 When the barriers are in place and the gates are permanently open, Lake 
Michigan becomes the dominant factor on the water levels in CAWS in 
downtown area and North Shore Canal. With high water levels in the Lake 
the barriers would keep CAWS higher during dry weather and pre-storm 
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conditions than without the barriers. But, when Lake Michigan levels stays 
near historic minimum, water levels on the lakeside of CAWS would be lower 
than under “ideal” current conditions, and navigation would be impacted. 
This is because the regulation capacity of Lockport and the controlling works 
at the Lakefront would be lost with the barriers. 
 Storage capacity of CAWS that allows for flow reversal minimization to Lake 
Michigan would be significatively reduced with the barrier because the 
lakefront gates would be open even during dry weather conditions. 
 On the Main Steam Chicago River (Columbus Dr.) the peak flow would be 
reached earlier because the water is flowing directly to Lake Michigan instead 
of being partially stored in the canals. In case of flooding this means shorter 
response time for the City to respond to a flooding event in this area. 
 Lawrence Ave is strongly influenced by flows coming from NBCR. At the 
same time, high levels in Lawrence Ave may have backwater effects on the 
North Branch of Chicago River, by reducing its draining capacity and 
increasing the risk of flooding due to backups through submerged pipes 
and/or by overbank flow on that area. 
 Most of the CSOs are on the lakeside of the north barrier (Chicago River 
South branch, North branch, and Main Steam). Without the barriers these 
CSOs flow southward through Lockport and would be stored in the canal 
until available storage is used and the lakefront gates are open; in this manner 
reversal flows to Lake Michigan are minimized. However, with the barriers in 
place, most of the CSOs would be sent to Lake Michigan, mostly through the 
Main Steam of the Chicago River. 
 On the south side of the system the barriers reduce the flow through the 
CSSC as most of the CSO would flow to Lake Michigan. By 31st & Western, 
downstream of the barrier, the flow is basically limited to CSO discharges 
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from RAPS (max. about 5,000 cfs). Other significant inflow is Stickney WRP 
(2,500 cfs). On the Calumet River, Little Calumet River is the most important 
inflow into CAWS. By the south barrier, on the Lockport side, critical levels 
are not strongly affected by the barriers. 
 Close to the lakefront (Columbus, Wilmette) the probability of exceeding 
critical levels is lower than for stations at inner locations (Lawrence Ave, 
Grand Ave, and Roosevelt Rd.), where probabilities are increased in presence 
of the barrier. Most significant increments are for the case 100-year storm, 
Finite-TARP, and lake level at +3 CCD at Lawrence Ave. (+15 %), Roosevelt 
Rd. (+36%) and Grand Ave (+7%). 
Recommendations 
 Estimates on CSO volumes and hydrographs discharge into CAWS would 
gain accuracy with a model that accounts for river stage and open/close tide 
gates at outfalls. 
 Better estimates of discharge coefficients at controlling works gates could be 
obtained with more sophisticated numerical or physical models that account 
for complex 3D flows near the gates and proximities. 
 In order to avoid large variations on water levels during dry weather, 
operation rules of turbines and sluice gates at Lockport could be set to a goal 
or target level plus a small tolerance in monitoring locations. In this manner 
opening/closing gates would not be governed by maximum and minimum 
admissible water levels in the system all the time. 
 The discharge capacity of controlling works at Lockport is affected to some 
extent by the conditions of Des Plaines River. A better understanding of the 
hydraulics on that matter would improve the estimate of discharge capacity 
at Lockport Controlling Works, a major flood-control feature in the CAWS. 
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